Introduction
In recent years, researchers in both economics and finance have focused on business groups (BGs, hereafter) . In this paper, we look at European business groups across seven years (2001 through 2007) and study the characteristics of multinational and domestic-only business groups.
First, we show how the sales performance of firms belonging to multinational groups compares to that of domestic-only groups; second, we look at which characteristics of business groups make them more likely to transition from a domestic group towards a multinational status; and, finally, we look at patterns of first foreign acquisition and try to shed light on possible factors that can influence groups going multinational.
As this paper looks at business groups (BGs), a formal definition is provided. A business group (a.k.a a "corporate group") is defined as a group consisting of two or more legally independent firms operating in multiple and often distinct markets, in which affiliates are under the control of one ultimate owner at the top of the pyramid. Pyramid structures are built through a series of chains of equity ties from the headquarters to all its subsidiaries (La Porta et al, 1999; Almeida and Wolfensohn, 2006) , in which the ultimate owner owns the subsidiary either directly-i.e., with direct ownership of its subsidiary-or indirectly-i.e., with an ownership stake through one or more intermediate firms. Being a part of a business group allows interaction among the affiliates, while allowing them to keep their independent status to make final decisions and access markets. It is this latter property that distinguishes business groups from multidivisional markets and standalones. The smallest business group is composed of two firms, with one affiliate and one headquarters. Multinational business groups have at least one firm from a different country than the ultimate holder.
Studies have highlighted the importance of business groups in a number of ways. First, studies dating back as early as the 1980s have shown that group-affiliated firms are more profitable than standalone companies. Chang and Choi (1998) showed that the performance of group-affiliated firms was more profitable than standalone firms in South Korea; other studies have shown that business groups are able to offset imperfect institutions and missing markets (Caves, 1989; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Carney et al., 2011; Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004) . Groups also have shown to be effective in sharing management talent and informational flows (Khanna and Palepu, 1997) and in redistributing the financial resources that benefit groups-affiliates' innovative performance (Belonzon and Berkovitz, 2010) . The correlation among business group structure, vertical integration and productivity has been analyzed by Altomonte and Rungi (2013) . The management literature has focused primarily on within-firm structures, mainly in the context of managerial know-how, with firms modeled as hierarchical organizations of expertise (Garicano, 2000; Garicano and Rossi Hansberg, 2004 Garicano and Hubbard, 2007; Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012) .
While more and more studies have focused on how groups matter and why business groups exist, most of their analysis is limited to business group affiliate performance-that is, comparing standalone firms to group-affiliated firms. Little has been done to analyze various group structures-in particular, the differences between multinational and domestic groups. We know that multinational firms tend to do better and are stronger than national firms, but the differences between nationals and multinationals at the group level has not been explored to date, and it is this gap that we aim to fill.
We know that multinational enterprises (MNEs) have attracted increased attention in the economic literature over the past decade, being at the center of various fields, such as international trade, international finance, management and organizational economics. This is not surprising given the relevance of MNEs in the global economy. According to estimates by Unctad (2011), multinational firms represent 25% of global GDP and account for around one third of international trade.
It is well known that enterprises become multinational to gain access to larger markets, to secure cheaper input for production, and to gain access to knowledge. Studies have also shown that plants belonging to MNEs differ from non-MNE plants in both their characteristics and their performance.
These plants tend to be larger and more innovative, to perform better, and to pay higher wages. (Doms and Jensen, 1998; Crisculo, Haskel and Slaughter, 2004) .
This difference in firm performance of national versus multinational ownership can be explained in a number of ways: first, if the acquiring foreign owner is more productive, we observe a positive spillover to subsidiaries; second, if the foreign firm comes from a technologically advanced country, the firm enables technology transfer to the subsidiary, hence allowing for better subsidiary performance (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2006; Carluccio and Fally, 2010; Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012) . Studies such as Lipsey and Sjoholm (2002) and Girma and Holger (2007) also find a positive post-acquisition wage effect. All of these studies provide compelling evidence for the positive effects of foreign ownership on plant performance. The vital role that multinationals play leads us to ask: what propels business groups to become multinational?
The contribution of this paper is to bridge the literature on Multinational Enterprises and that on Business Groups. As previously discussed, the benefits of belonging to an MNE have been identified: we know why firms chose to cross borders, and we have an understanding of the benefits of belonging to BGs. However, little is known about the dynamics of national and multinational business groups in terms of (i) their respective subsidiaries' sales performance; (ii) the characteristics that lead a group to transition into a multinational status; and (iii) how these domestic groups start their first foreign acquisition in terms of: the countries they decide to enter; the level of the pyramid ownership structure at which the acquisition takes place (see Section 2, "Data," for more details on the definition of pyramid ownership); and whether they decide to take advantage of comparative advantage by acquiring a firm in a different sector of their own.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed analysis of the data used in this paper and includes descriptive statistics on the period studied. In Section 3, we divide business groups into two categories, multinational and domestic groups, and look at differences at both the group level and the subsidiary level. Multinational groups are larger (in terms of number of firms in a group), more hierarchical (in terms of the verticality of the group, measured as the distance between the headquarters and the furthest subsidiary in the ownership chain), and have greater sectoral diversity than national groups. Groups expand primarily in their home country and expand across countries only progressively.
Subsidiaries belonging to multinational groups have higher employment, capital and sales than those in domestic-only groups. We conclude this section by running a simple OLS regression on subsidiary sales, controlling for group and firm characteristics and including fixed effects. We find that subsidiaries belonging to multinational business groups have a 15% higher sale premium and 12% higher value added than those in domestic groups. In Section 4, we first want to understand whether domestic groups become stronger once they gain multinational status (treatment effect) or whether the groups switching to multinational status had different characteristics to start with that allowed them to become multinational (selection effect); second we identify possible drivers to multinational status. We find that firms that belong to switching groups are larger in terms of employment and have higher sales and value added than those in always-domestic groups even before becoming multinational. Likewise, on a group level, switching groups have a different structure from always-domestic groups: they have more affiliates and higher sectoral diversity and are more hierarchical in terms of the number of layers in their group. This suggests a strong selection into becoming multinational. We conclude by using a linear probability model to assess which group characteristics are associated with a group transitioning into a multinational status. We find that better-performing and more-capitalintense groups are more likely to become multinationals, and the probability of becoming a multinational also increases with the size of the group and with group hierarchy. Our last section, Section 5, analyzes how a domestic group becomes multinational by looking at the countries in which domestic groups first make their first foreign acquisition; the layer of the hierarchy at which they acquire the foreign subsidiary; and the sector in which the newly acquired foreign firm is active. We find evidence that (i) most groups acquire their first subsidiary in neighbouring regions or in regions that are legally and culturally similar; (ii) that a "corporate-level decision" is made when acquiring a foreign subsidiary, as the new affiliate comes in at the top layer of the group, close to headquarters; and (iii) that the first foreign subsidiary is usually from a different sector than the overwhelming part of the group and from a different sector than the headquarters, suggesting that becoming a multinational is to take advantage of a new country's comparative advantage. the maximum layer at which the subsidiary is present. From these statistics, we construct our own business conglomerate measures: total levels (layers) of the business group; the number of affiliates in a group (business group size); and the number of affiliates on a given layer. These variables will aid us to understand the pyramidal structure of the group-that is, the group hierarchy (verticality) in terms of the number of layers in a group and the level on which the affiliates are present.
Sample Construction
The original panel of pyramid business groups across seven years contains over 10,000,000 firm-year observations. To arrive at our final sample, we consider the following restrictions: (1 5 Each subsidiary belongs to one ultimate owner for two reasons: i) the ultimate owner must own at least 50.01% of the subsidiary; therefore, each subsidiary can belong to only one ultimate owner in a given year; and ii) the handful of subsidiaries where the subsidiary switched ultimate owners across the years is dropped to make the analysis as clean as possible.
Descriptive Statistics
In this section, we provide some descriptive statistics on the final sample.
The panel for our analysis ranges from 2001 to 2007 ( Table 1 ). The number of business groups in our sample increases with time; however, in 2007, our sample drops due to the truncated version of the last available year in the pyramid dataset provided by Bena et al. (2009 Denmark appears to have the largest business groups, and this seems to be related to the presence of few very large groups at the top of the distribution. Portugal and Switzerland also have large business groups, but in their case, the distribution seems entirely shifted towards larger BGs, as suggested by a median business group size that is almost twice as large than those of the other countries. The average size of a business group in our total sample (represented by all 34 countries) is 3.37. Table 2 provides information on business group size (number of firms in a group) by country, where the country refers to the headquarters' location.
The sample comprises 34 countries, but for ease of presentation, the table reports the first 20 countries in terms of the highest concentration of business groups (47,682 business groups, which account for 98% of business groups in our total sample). We then give statistics on the 50 th and 90 th percentiles, the maximum number of firms in the business group and the total number of business groups by country of origin (ultimate holder's country). Finally, our last column reports the share of total business groups in the sample with headquarters originating in the given country. As the table reveals, a large share of our business groups (75.5%) have headquarters in France, Sweden and Spain. The second column tells us the mean of business group size in terms of the number of subsidiaries for each country. In terms of mean size, we cannot conclude that Southern European or Northern European countries have a larger number of firms within their business groups. Denmark appears to have the largest business groups, and this seems to be related to the presence of few very large groups at the top of the distribution. Portugal and Switzerland also have large business groups, but in their case, the distribution seems entirely shifted towards larger BGs, as suggested by a median business group size that is almost twice as large than those of the other countries. The average size of a business group in our total sample (represented by all 34 countries) is 3.37. Note: Column (1) shows the mean number of subsidiaries in a business group by county of origin (defined by the country of ultimate holder). Column (2) reports the 50th percentile, column (3) the 90th, column (4) the maximum number of firms in the business group, and column (5) the total number of business groups in the respective country. Finally, column (6) reports the share of total business groups in the sample with headquarters originating from the given country. The source, data and sample used are the same as described in Table 1 .
There are a total of 34 countries in our sample, of which, for ease of presentation, the table reports the first 20 countries in terms of the highest concentration of business groups (47,692 business groups which account for 98% of all business groups). Total represents the statistics for all our 34 countries in our sample (47948 business groups). Table 3 reports the size of the groups (number of firms in a group) for the pooled sample. There is a large difference in the number of firms per group: the majority (63%) of our sample is represented by small groups, composed of two firms (an ultimate holder and its affiliate); 26% are composed of three or four firm groups, while the remaining categories make up the remaining 11% of our business groups. Differences in business group size are reflected, in part, by the degree of hierarchy in the pyramid of groups defined as the number of layers, which is described in Table 4 (for definition of layers, turn to the beginning of this section). The majority of our groups have one layer (all subsidiaries being directly under the headquarters). However, even if the group is composed of more firms, subsidiaries seem to be concentrated at the first or second level, as the share of groups with only one layer is larger than the share of groups with only one subsidiary. This suggests that, generally, the group's expansion is a centralized decision, and only for very large groups do subsidiaries play an active part in its expansion. Note: Total Layers reflects the degree of hierarchy of the business group. 1 layer defines a flat business group, where the subsidiaries are directly under the ultimate holder (1 distance away). 2 and more layers imply that there are subsidiaries that are not directly below the ultimate holder-that is, they are at least 2 distances away from the ultimate holder, with subsidiaries found between the ultimate holder and the respective subsidiary. # BGs are the number of groups by category of hierarchy. % represents the share of the total business groups in the sample belonging to the respective category. Source, data and sample used are as described in Table 1 .
Lastly, we look at the industry diversity of groups. For a sector diversity group measure, the affiliates' 4-digit NACE is taken to construct a diversity index using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). 6 As we are interested in the sectoral diversity of the group, the 1-HHI index is taken. In general, sector diversification increases with the number of firms in the group (apart from the last category-however, this statistic is based on few observations). As Table 5 shows, the larger groups have more scope for diversifying their activities and might be willing to engage in vertical integration, thus including in the group suppliers that might belong to different sectors. Note: # Affiliates reflects the number of firms in a business group. Sectoral Diversity is calculated as the average number of sectors that the business groups are active in by country of headquarters. Sectors are defined at the NACE 4 level. Source and sample are constructed as described in Table 3 .
Multinational Groups vs Domestic Groups
We further our analysis of business groups by looking at the differences in the characteristics of multinational and non-multinational groups. The first part of this section provides details on the sample composition in terms of group categories (never multinational, always multinational) and presents descriptive statistics regarding the characteristics of these groups and of their respective subsidiaries. The second part focuses on the sales performance premium of firms in multinational groups accounting for differences in observables. This allows us to isolate the pure multinational effect from compositional changes; for example, firms in multinational groups might be larger to begin with, and, hence, a pure sales comparison between the two categories would not be appropriate.
Multinational vs Domestic Group Characteristics
We introduce simple summary statistics of our multinational and national groups in our sample. Table 6 gives brief summary statistics of the percentage of domestic versus multinational groups by country of origin (defined as the country where headquarters are located). In our sample, the countries with the highest share of multinational groups are Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. While Denmark and Portugal have only multinational groups, these countries represent just a small fraction of our business groups. Business groups with headquarters in Bulgaria, the United Kingdom and Austria are almost all domestic, but, again, these countries represent only a small proportion of our business groups-probably due to the limitation of accounting and financial information. Most of the business groups in France, Sweden and Spain are also domestic; however, given the high share of groups that they represent, even the small share of multinational groups amounts to a sizable number of the total multinational groups in our sample. Note: Column (1) shows the total number of groups by country. Of these, Column (2) Non-MN reports the number of groups that are domestic by country, and column (4) MN reports the total number of groups that are multinational. Columns (3) and (5) report the shares of domestic versus multinational groups by country. There are a total of 34 countries in our sample, of which, for ease of presentation, the table reports the first 20 countries in terms of the highest concentration of business groups (47,692 business groups, which account for 98% of all business groups). Total represents the statistics for all 34 countries in our sample (47,948 business groups). The data come from the Amadeus dataset (Bureau Van Dijk) for years [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . The sample is restricted to business groups and subsidiaries in which (i) the ultimate holders and subsidiaries were present for at least two years; (ii) aggregate ownership of the ultimate holder in the subsidiary exceeds 50.01%; and (iii) information on the number of employees, tangible fixed assets and sales are available for the firm.
It is important to note that the size of the business groups (number of firms in a group) is consistently larger when groups are multinational as opposed to domestic, irrespective of the country considered (Table 7) .
Moreover, looking at the 99th percentile, respectively, we see that the largest multinational groups are substantially larger than their domestic counterparts for each country in our sample. Note: Column (1) represents the average number of subsidiaries per group for domestic groups, and column (2) represents the 99th percentile broken down by country of headquarters. Similarly, for multinational groups, columns (3) and (4) represent the average number of subsidiaries per group and the 99th percentile, respectively, by country of headquarters. Source, data and sample used are as described in the Note of Table 6 .
Difference in size is also related to differences in other dimensions, such as the hierarchy in the pyramid structure of the group and sectoral diversification. Table 8 shows that groups that are cross-national also have a higher level of sectoral diversity-that is, their subsidiaries belong to more sectors. Similarly, multinational groups are more hierarchical and span more layers (subsidiaries can be farther from their) than their national counterparts within each country. With the systematic differences between multinational and domestic groups across countries, we can safely claim that these differences are not country-specific. Note: The table reflects the diversity characteristics for domestic (Non-MN) and multinational (MN) groups by country of headquarters. Domestic groups are those in which all firms belonging to a group are from the ultimate holder's country, while multinational groups are those in which at least one firm comes from a different country than the ultimate holder. Column (1) shows the average sectoral diversity of firms belonging to domestic and multinational business groups by country of headquarters, where sector is at the NACE 4 level. Column (2) reflects the average number of layers business groups have, and column (3) shows the average number of countries present in groups by country of headquarters. Source, data and sample used are as described in the Note of Table 6 .
Multinational groups expand across countries progressively and select countries according to expected cost of entry and potential benefit. On the one hand, multinational groups could expand first into neighbouring countries, as this kind of expansion probably involves lower transaction costs. On the other hand, a group might be willing to face higher costs in the presence of higher expected revenues. Countries with especially larger markets, for example, might be more attractive to groups eager to get direct access to consumers. In order to shed light on this aspect, it is worth explicitly examining the country composition of subsidiaries. This is done in Table 9 , which reports the mean number of subsidiaries for each country. As seen on the diagonal of the table, as expected, in all the countries, business groups tend to expand in their home country primarily. This appears reasonable, as a group would tend to consolidate its structure in its home country, where transaction costs are lowest, before moving into different countries. Previous steps have shown that multinational groups tend, at the aggregate level, to be different from domestic groups along several dimensions. Our analysis, however, has neglected possible differences at the subsidiary level. Firms belonging to multinational business groups could be larger and more profitable, thus allowing the headquarters to face the cost of making the group multinational. We address this question in Table 10, which compares affiliate-level size and profitability measures across our groups of firms by country of headquarters' origin. More specifically, we look at whether subsidiaries belonging to multinational groups are, on average, statistically different in terms of employment, capital and sales to subsidiaries in national groups. For each characteristic, the first two columns report averages for firms, whereas the last column for each set of firm characteristics reports the p-values for the differences in averages. Subsidiaries of multinational groups are larger in terms of both capital and employment. They also have higher sales, which suggests a possible higher profitability; however, this could be related to differences in the other observables or to the group structure. We address this concern more formally in the next section in a regression framework. capital and sales. For each characteristic, the first two columns report averages for firms, whereas the last column for each set of firm characteristics reports the p-values for the differences of average. The table reports these results for firms belonging to the first 20 countries in terms of the highest concentration of business groups. The data come from the Amadeus dataset (Bureau Van Dijk) for years 2001-2007. 
Subsidiary sales performance in Multinational versus
Non-Multinational groups.
Our first empirical strategy focuses on understanding whether a sales premium of subsidiaries in multinational groups, as opposed to those in domestic-only groups, is due to differences in group characteristics. We control for different organizational characteristics that we previously found for multinational and domestic groups (hierarchy, size and sectoral diversity of groups). We compare subsidiaries that belong to multinational groups to subsidiaries in domestic-only groups. The first part of the analysis is based on a classical Cobb-Douglas production function. This specification describes the effect of belonging to a multinational group on subsidiary sales. For estimating the production function, we use standard input variables: and , which are labour and capital of subsidiary i. Our variable of interest is MN gt , a dummy variable taking on value 1 if business group g is multinational at time t. Our coefficient of interest is β 1 . A positive coefficient of β 1 would imply that being part of a multinational group is correlated with higher subsidiary sales. We control for different group characteristics found in the previous section for multinational and domestic-only groups. We control for hierarchy in the pyramid structure of a group by including a set of controls for the total number of layers in a group, Layer gtk . These allow for a richer description of the effects of the hierarchy on sales performance, allowing for a clearer identification of non-linearities such as those identified by Altomonte et al. (2013) . Similarly, we control for the effects of the size of the group using a set of dummy variables identifying different size classes based on the number of firms in group g at time t, _ . As multinational groups are more likely to be large, we introduce the size control to avoid a biased multinational coefficient. _ , the diversity of the sector of the group (identified by NACE 2), is also included to control for the level of sectoral diversification within a group. The sectoral diversity of a group might be related to its degree of vertical integration or to its level of diversification, which can lead to a higher level of sales if sectors in the group are characterized by synergies. Furthermore, year fixed effects t are included to control for common time shock. Finally, ε gt is a random noise error term at the group level at time t.
We find that firms belonging to a multinational group have 15-percentage-point higher sales than those in non-multinational groups after controlling for firm characteristics, group characteristics and country/sector fixed effects.
The results in Table 11 show, on an affiliate level, the effect of being in a multinational group on subsidiary performance (log of subsidiary sales), accounting for different group characteristics. Column (1) shows the crosssectional effect of belonging to a multinational group and finds that being in such a group is positively correlated with firm sales. Firms belonging to multinational business groups have about 36% higher sales than those in national groups (without the inclusion of fixed effects). Column (2) introduces year fixed effects to control for yearly shocks; headquarters sector fixed effects to ensure that it is not the headquarters' industry characteristic that is driving the result; location fixed effects. The result still shows 19% higher sales for firms belonging to multinational groups. Column (3) includes fixed effects for country and sector composition and interactions between country and sector fixed effects to allow for a more flexible heterogeneity, still resulting in 15% higher sales for firms belonging to multinational groups.
Although the multinational premium drops considerably (by approximately one half), it is still substantial and highly statistically significant. More hierarchical groups with more layers are also correlated with higher subsidiary sales. Finally, this result is confirmed using a more refined measure in column (4): firms in multinational business groups have 12%
higher value added ceteris paribus. This is in line with the previous literature on multinationals, which points out the better performance of firms belonging to multinational enterprises (Doms and Jensen, 1998; Crisculo, Haskel and Slaughter, 2004) . 
Becoming a Multinational Group
We previously showed that multinational groups have more industry diversity and are more hierarchical than national groups. Given the sales premium of subsidiaries in multinational groups, even after controlling for group characteristics, it is imperative to understand whether domestic groups become stronger after gaining their multinational status (treatment effect), or whether these switchers have different characteristics that allow them to become multinational (selection effect). We first examine whether switchers already look different from always-domestic groups before their first international move, and, second, we identify possible drivers to multinational status.
Domestic Groups that make a foreign acquisition
Until this point in our analysis, we have concentrated on two large groups:
multinational and domestic. As Table 12 , shows, domestic groups can be further divided into two groups: always-domestic (never change to multinational status) and those that went through a change by acquiring a foreign firm.
Panel A of Table 12 shows that 12% are always multinational, that the overwhelming majority, 86%, remain domestic and never switch, and 3% are domestic groups that switch status at some point. One can draw a similar conclusion by looking at Panel B: throughout our entire study period, 17%
belonged to groups that were multinational. Meanwhile, 80% of our firms belong to groups that remained domestic, while a small share of firms, 3%, belonged to groups that experienced a change in status. Note: Panel A shows the division of business groups, while Panel B shows the division of subsidiaries that are national versus domestic. Multinationals are those that have always been multinational throughout our sample, identified as Always. Domestic status is further divided into two groups: Never-that is, never changed to multinational status-and those that went through a switch by acquiring a foreign firm, identified as Switchers. These are constructed based on our 47,948 business groups that have, in total, 74,213 subsidiaries. The data comes from the Amadeus dataset (Bureau van Dijk) for years 2001-2007. We now narrow our analysis to the two domestic groups: alwaysdomestic and those that were domestic and switched status. Table 13 shows a comparison of the subsidiary firms of switching groups and alwaysdomestic groups, using a simple average comparison. The first two columns report averages for firm characteristics, while the last two columns report pvalues of t-test for differences in averages between the two categories:
switchers and domestic groups (column 3). There appear to be important differences between domestic subsidiaries belonging to groups that will switch to a multinational status (these firms are still considered in their domestic state), and domestic subsidiaries that remain in national groups.
On average, firms in groups that switch employ more people than do firms in domestic groups. In addition, they also have higher productivity, as proxied by sales and value added per worker. This is consistent with models such as those of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , where access to a foreign market is related to a productivity threshold rule. By the same token, in this setting, groups may become multinational after the average productivity of its subsidiaries is sufficient to offset the costs of internationalization. Moreover, on a group level, switching groups are structurally different from alwaysdomestic groups: they have more affiliates in their group, have higher sectoral diversity and are more hierarchical in terms of the number of layers in a group. Note: The table compares the subsidiary firms of always-domestic groups (Domestic) and switching groups (Switchers) in our sample, using a simple average comparison. Column (1) and column (2) report averages for firm characteristics for the two groups, respectively. The upper panel does the analysis at the subsidiary level, while the lower panel does it at the group level. Column (3) reports p-values (p-value) of the t-test for differences in averages between the two categories: switchers and domestic groups. Data are from the Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk) dataset, 2001-2007, and the subsample considered is the one described in Table 12 . However, only two types of business groups are considered from this subsample-those that become multinational and those that were never multinational (groups always having a multinational status in the study period are dropped). This leads to 44,159 business groups, which have in total 65,454 subsidiaries.
To evaluate which group characteristics are associated with a group transitioning into multinational status, we rely on equation (2). This specification aims to identify which business groups are more likely to become multinational. The two groups in our regression are those that are never multinational and those that become multinational. A linear probability model is used to assess the probability of the group becoming multinational given its characteristics. Our specification is:
BG_size gj + β 4 Industry Diversity g + t + g + g + ε g ,
where the dependent variable,
, is a dummy variable taking on a value of one if business group g becomes a multinational at any point during our sample period. is the average log employment of a subsidiary in business group g; / is the average log capital intensity of a subsidiary for group g, while is the average log of sales of a subsidiary for group g. Similar to specification (1), we include a set of dummies for the number of layers in the group, a set of business group size dummies, and a variable to control for the sectoral diversity of a group.
Included also are controls, (i) t for the year in which the group appears in the panel 7 to account for any year shocks; (ii) for the industry of the company headquarters, g , as the headquarters' sector can influence business strategies on how to expand the group, which, in turn, can be correlated with becoming a multinational; and (iii) headquarters county, g , which allows us to control for the possibility of different patterns of internationalization according to country. We also include (iv) dummies for sector composition;
and, finally, (v) interaction between country and sectors fixed effects to allow for a certain degree of heterogeneity across countries. The results of equation (2) will allow us to describe which characteristics of a group seem to matter for its transition into a multinational group.
Groups that become multinational are compared strictly with groups that are never multinational (always-multinational groups are excluded in this setting). On a group level, the results in Table 14 suggest that betterperforming and more-capital-intense groups (proxied by the average log of sales and log of capital intensity for the subsidiaries in these groups) are more likely to become multinational: a one-percentage-point increase in average sales for subsidiaries in the group leads to a 0.008-percentage-point increase in the probability of becoming a multinational group (the magnitude of the effect is, however, small). The probability of becoming a multinational group increases with the size of the group (number of firms in a group), as well as with group hierarchy (measured as the number of layers in a group).
These results clearly show that domestic groups in our sample that become switchers already look different than always-domestic groups prior to their first international acquisition; therefore, our findings suggest that there is a strong selection into becoming multinational. [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . The subsample considered is the one described in Table 1 . However, only two types of business groups are considered-those that become multinational and those that were never multinational (groups always having a multinational status in the study period are dropped).
The First Foreign Acquisition
We now examine how a group becomes multinational-what the first acquired subsidiary of these switching groups looks like. We analyse how the first foreign subsidiary compares to the existing domestic subsidiaries: (i)
geographically-whether it is close or distant from the domestic group's country; (ii) the layer at which it enters within the hierarchy of the group; and (iii) the industry in which it performs its activity. By so doing, we hope to shed light on some of the reasons that a business group might choose to go multinational. Table 2 . Countries with more groups tend to have a larger number of switchers. This is expected, and it ensures that the country composition in previous sections will be reflected in the present analysis.
As reported in Table 15 , many business groups acquire their first subsidiary in neighbouring regions or in regions that are legally and culturally similar to their own. This is in line with standard gravity model results in the trade literature. Business groups in Spain, for example, acquire subsidiaries mostly in Portugal, which aligns with the idea of acquiring firms in close geographic proximity. Similarly, French groups enter Belgium (both culturally close and neighbouring), Spain (bordering country) and countries characterized by rich and large markets, such as Germany, the UK and Italy (with which it also retains some historical ties). Many of these groups also acquire their first subsidiary in Germany. This comes as no surprise given the large market and hub for industrial production that Germany offers. We also observe that business groups in a large number of countries enter the Netherlands, also perhaps due to its proximity to Germany and its sea access to the Nordic countries.
Table 15. Probability of Becoming a Multinational Group
Note: The table shows domestic groups that make their first foreign acquisition (switchers) in the time period studied (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . To maintain consistency with the rest of the tables in terms of countries represented, we report only switching groups (742 observations) belonging to those 20 countries that had the highest concentration of business groups in our original sample (as reflected in Table 2 ). BG HQ's Nationality is the ultimate holder's nationality, while Subsidiary's Country of First Move reflects the foreign country into which the business group first decided to expand. Data are from the Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk) dataset.
AT BE CH CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR IT NL NO PL PT RO SE
The group's decision to become multinational can be made at various levels within the group: the acquisition could be done by the headquarters or by one of the close subsidiaries; a decision at the top level could imply a "corporate-level decision"; or a decision by a different subsidiary could represent an independent move with respect to the rest of the group. In the latter case, the acquisition would also change the group structure, making it more hierarchical by increasing the number of layers. Table 16 reports the tabulation of the mode of the level in the domestic part of the group and the mode of the level of the entrant that makes the group multinational (we use the mode since, in a few cases, there are more than one new foreign subsidiaries). As the table reflects, becoming a multinational group appears to be mainly a centralized decision by the headquarters or one of its close subsidiaries. The mode of the entrant making the group multinational is at a higher level than the mode of the layer of domestic subsidiaries. There are 583 groups for which the mode of the layer of subsidiaries belonging to the group is level 1. In 344 of these cases, the mode of the foreign subsidiary that first makes the group multinational also comes in at level 1, at the top-that is, directly under the headquarters.
However, in 228 of the cases, the subsidiaries that make the group multinational come in on level 2. The large number of observations on the main diagonal, which identifies groups whose new foreign subsidiary comes in at the typical level of existing domestic subsidiaries, suggests that the usual subsidiaries making acquisitions in the group are also responsible for the group internationalization. Differences in terms of layer of entry could also be related to some characteristics of the group or of the subsidiaries belonging to the group. In order to take these elements into account, we run a simple OLS regression on an affiliate level, having as our dependent variable the layer of the group to which the subsidiary belongs and as our independent variables several group and subsidiary characteristics (Table 17 ). The variable of interest is the dummy "New foreign Sub," which identifies the firm making the group multinational. This regression largely confirms what is shown in the Table 16: the level of entry of the foreign subsidiary is higher than, but quite close to, that of the typical firm in the group. This implies that the decision is made at the top, and, therefore, it reflects a "corporate-level decision" that can affect the whole group. Finally, we turn to the sector of the subsidiary that makes the group multinational. We proceed in two different ways: first, we compare the sector of the new firm to the one most common in the group (mode of the sector of domestic subsidiaries); then, we compare it to the sector of the ultimate owner. Also in this case, the mode of the sector of the entrant is used for the cases in which more than one entrant is present. Industry sectors are defined at NACE 4. Panel A of Table 18 shows that in two thirds of the cases, the sector of the new foreign entrant does not correspond to the sector of the classical majority of the group. Panel B of the table shows a comparison between the first acquired firm's sector-i.e., that is, the firm that made the group multinational-and the ultimate owner's sector. The sector of the new foreign firm coincides even less frequently with that of the ultimate owner. It seems, then, that the new foreign firm does not belong to the characteristic domain of activity of the rest of the group. Therefore, our finding suggests that the group does not go multinational for the purpose of horizontal FDI, to perform local production to access local markets; rather, it goes multinational to diversify its activities with the aim of exploiting other countries' comparative advantage. Our finding is consistent with that of Alforo and Charlton (2009) , who show that once we get to detailed enough industry codes (4-digits), much of the FDI proves to be vertical. The findings presented in this section offer evidence about why a group goes multinational. The data suggest that a multinational expansion of a group is a rather centralized process, initiated by the ultimate owner itself or by one of the closest subsidiaries (layer 1), which means that it is a "corporate-level decision." This comes as no surprise, as the important strategic decision to expand into a different country probably has to take into account the group structure and characteristics. However, the expansion seems to also further diversify the group in terms of economic activity: the first foreign subsidiary is usually from a different sector than the major part of the group and from a different sector than that of its ultimate owner. This suggests that group multinational expansion might be driven by the desire to acquire particular inputs from a foreign country or to make use of a country's comparative advantage.
Conclusion
An extensive literature provides evidence on the advantages of affiliate performance when belonging to business groups (BGs), as opposed to being standalones, as well as the benefits of multinational enterprises over domestic firms. However, no attempt had been made so far to connect these two streams of the literature and to analyse business groups from a multinational/domestic perspective. This paper aims to bridge the two different literatures by exploiting the Amadeus dataset, together with the business group information from the dataset of Bena, Fons-Rosen and Hanousek (2009) . We look at sales performance of firms that belong to a multinational business group and analyse possible drivers that increase the likelihood of becoming a multinational group. We then look at how the acquisition of multinational status affects the group structure and activities by focusing on the first foreign subsidiary acquired.
Multinational groups appear to differ substantially from domestic groups: they are usually larger and more hierarchical in terms of group structure; and their subsidiaries also appear to be superior to subsidiaries of domestic groups in terms of both size and sales performance. More specifically, we find that firms belonging to multinational groups have 15%
higher sales after accounting for differences in observables at the group and firm levels.
Transition to multinational status is related to group characteristics.
Groups that are larger (with more affiliates) and more hierarchical (having many layers in the group), and those that have higher sectoral diversity (industry mix of the affiliates) are more likely to become multinational. This suggest that there is a strong selection into becoming a multinational.
The transition to multinational status appears to be a rather centralized decision. The foreign subsidiary is, in most of cases, acquired by the ultimate owner itself or by a subsidiary directly controlled by it. This implies that the decision does not have substantial effects on the business group structure.
However, foreign subsidiaries appear to differ from the group with respect to their main economic activity: only in a minority of cases does the sector of the first foreign subsidiary coincide with the sector of domestic subsidiaries or with that of the headquarters. This provides some preliminary evidence that the decision to acquire a foreign subsidiary might be driven by the group's desire to expand its set of activities, possibly gaining access to valuable inputs to exploit a country's relative advantage in some sector.
